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I. INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
A. What Is Climate Change?
Climate change,' according to the United Nations Convention, is
"a change of climate which [is] attributed directly or indirectly to
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over
comparable time periods." 2 Climate change occurs because of the
increase of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, gases that
include carbon dioxide (C0 2), ozone, nitrous oxide, halocarbons,
methane, and other industrial gases.3
Scientists have concluded that in order to avoid the most damaging
results from climate change and global warming, it is necessary to
limit warming to two degrees Celsius over pre-industrial revolution
temperatures.4 Atmospheric levels of GHGs have increased almost
forty percent from pre-industrial levels of 280 to 380 parts per
* Stephen Sewalk, Ph.D./J.D., is an Assistant Professor for the Burns School of
Real Estate and Construction Management, Daniels College of Business,
University of Denver. The author wishes to thank Ned Vanda for reviewing drafts
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1. In this paper, the term climate change is used to refer to both changing
weather patterns and global warming.
2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1 2, May
9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
3. LUDIVINE TAMIOTTI ET AL., U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME & WORLD TRADE
ORG., TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2-3 (2009).
4. Mike Young, Two Degrees Warmer May Be Past the Tipping Point, U.
POST (Nov. 12, 2009, 6:06 AM), http://universitypost.dk/article/two-degrees-
warmer-may-be-past-tipping-point.
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million (ppm) as of 2011.5 Over the past 650,000 years, atmospheric
levels of GHGs have remained within the range of 180 ppm to 300
6 -
ppm. This sustained increase is attributed to increasing man-made
emissions. From 1970 to 2004, GHG emissions increased by seventy
percent.7 Present levels of emissions are not sustainable. The
Potsdam Institute determined that the environment can manage up to
350 ppm, a level that has already been exceeded.8 Even if emissions
levels were to be reduced to the 2000-year levels and remain
constant, the earth would still have a warming trend of 0.1 degree
Celsius every ten years due to the slow feedback of the oceans.9 Real
reductions are needed, simply keeping emissions at current levels
(387-400 ppm) would result in the globe warming by at least 2.8
degrees from the time of the industrial revolution until the end of the
millennials' lifetimes.10 Therefore, the primary concern is how to
best respond to the current level of emissions and prevent the
forecasted increase in emissions levels."
B. Cause of Climate Change
The majority of GHG emissions are caused by natural events;
however, the environment in a delicate balancing process absorbs
these emissions. The rapid increase in atmospheric levels of GHGs
over the past one hundred years has been caused by rapidly
increasing anthropogenic emissions, which are directly related to
human activity, commonly referred to as "anthropogenic forcing."1 2
The two leading causes are deforestation and burning of fossil
5. Brian C. Murray & Heather Hosterman, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade
and the Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 699, 699 (2009).
Ppms are measured in CO 2 equivalents. Id.
6. Id. at 700.
7. Terry Barker et al., Summary for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 3 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf.
8. Young, supra note 4, at 1.
9. Murray & Hosterman, supra note 5, at 702-03.
10. Young, supra note 4, at 1.
11. TAMIOTTI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
12. Id. at 3.
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fuels,13 which include fuels burned for transportation, manufacturing,
electricity generation, and buildings, among others.14 These are all
causes that are directly related to human activities.
C. Commonly Accepted Consequences
Uncontrolled rapid increases in GHG emissions create significant
risk of adverse impacts on the environment potentially resulting in
changes that cannot be reversed. Global climate change leads to snow
caps and glaciers melting, sea levels rising, and changing weather
patterns (resulting in flooding and draughts).15 In the United
Kingdom alone, as many as 490,000 properties are at risk of flooding
due to rising sea levels, and the risk impacts all countries with ocean
shorelines. 16 Climate change will impact infrastructure, agriculture,
and lifestyle potentially leading to decreasing standards of living,
especially in communities that have an economy sensitive to
variations in climate. This includes many of the developing
countries that are primarily agriculture-based economies.
II. BALANCING SUSTAINABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT
Given the grave consequences that climate change may cause, it is
surprising that more has not been done to fight climate change. The
global reluctance to implement climate controls stems from the
tension between development and growth. World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules, as addressed below, emphasize free trade over
environmental sustainability and tend to take precedence over
multilateral climate change agreements. 8 The tension is also found in
objections raised by both developing and developed countries against
agreements that reduce GHG emissions.
13. Id.
14. Murray & Hosterman, supra note 5, at 700.
15. Id. at 702.
16. Climate Change Explained, ENV'T AGENCY, http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/climatechange/31802.aspx (last updated Jan. 16,
2014).
17. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 37 (2009).
18. Dominic A. Gentile, Note, International Trade and the Environment: What
Is the Role of the WTO?, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 197, 198-201 (2009).
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A. Carbon Leakage
There is a concern in developed countries that if they impose heavy
restrictions on carbon emissions these restrictions will only apply to
domestic producers and not imports, leading to carbon leakage.
Carbon leakage occurs when a developed country threatens or puts
into effect restrictions on carbon emissions (cap-and-trade, for
example), and subsequently emission-dependent industries relocate
to countries with no emissions restrictions.19 There is anecdotal
evidence that this has already occurred during the 1990s and 2000s.
The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1992) leading to the
Kyoto Protocol called upon developed countries to reduce GHG
emissions. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries
with no emissions objectives or restrictions boomed following these
announcements leading to rapidly rising emissions in developing
countries. It appears that by developed countries promising to cap
emissions, corporations (and individuals) concerned for their profits
and production flooded developing countries with significant FDI.
Setting up schemes like Kyoto and the EU-ETS, without including
everyone, allowed developing countries to benefit (increasing FDI as
polluting industries relocated) because of the failure to internalize
(tax) emissions. This was very environmentally counter-productive as
20
global emissions have soared.
Due to this flood of FDI and China's omission to internalize
21
emissions, China now blames one-third of its emissions on exports,
a situation clearly not anticipated by Kyoto. Even though the
European Union and United States have minimized increases in their
emissions levels since 2000 based on emissions intensities (Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)/total GHG emissions) of imports versus
19. Glen Peters, Norwegian Univ. of Sci. and Tech., Reassessing Carbon
Leakage 3, Eleventh Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, "Future of
Global Economy," Helsinki, Finland, June 12-14, 2008, https://
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/3751.pdf.
20. John M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental
Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries,
12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 157-58 (2010).
21. Duncan Clark, West Blamed for Rapid Increase in China's C0 2, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 22, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/feb/23/china-co2-
emissions-climate.
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exports, total emissions, including imports, have skyrocketed.22
Meanwhile, countries such as Brazil and Malaysia continue to
contribute to global emissions by cutting down their forests.23 It is
these concerns that led U.S. Congressmen Henry Waxman and
Edward Markey to propose a carbon tax on imports for countries that
24do not internalize the cost of emissions. In addition, this is why the
European Union attempted to impose a carbon tax on airlines flying
25into the European Union. Developed countries, such as the United
States and member countries of the European Union, are concerned
that unless imports are included in emissions restrictions, many
industries beneficial to their economies will relocate to avoid
internalizing the cost of their emissions. This difference between
Annex I and II countries convinced the United States to not sign the
treaty, as the United States noted that developing countries, such as
China, would not be subject to emissions limits, and U.S. industry
would be unfairly burdened resulting in relocation to countries with
- - 26
no emissions limits.
B. Loss ofMarket Share with No Environmental Benefit
Another argument against restrictions on carbon emissions is that
one country imposing restrictions on emissions will only transfer the
27emissions from one country to another. The relocation of factories
22. This is primarily due to carbon leakage of industry moving from the United
States, the European Union, and Japan to China. It is possible that Kyoto had the
unintended result of increasing global emissions by moving production from low
emission intensity countries to high emission intensity countries.
23. A carbon tax policy needs to take this into account, thereby discouraging
Brazil and Malaysia from cutting down their forests.
24. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
25. LoRAND BARTELS, THE INCLUSION OF AVIATION IN THE EU ETS: WTO
LAW CONSIDERATIONS 8-10 (ITCSD Trade & Sustainable Energy Series, Issue
Paper No. 6, 2012), http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/05/the-inclusion-of-aviation-
in-the-eu-ets-wto-law-considerations.pdf.
26. JANE A. LEGGETT ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., CHINA'S GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND MITIGATION POLICIES 25 (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/RL34659.pdf.
27. LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40100,
"CARBON LEAKAGE" AND TRADE: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 3 (2008), http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40100.pdf.
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and shuttering of domestic facilities would result in the developed
country losing global market share and employment. More
importantly, from a global perspective, most developed countries use
energy more efficiently and tend to have low emissions intensity.28
This can lead to moving production to less energy efficient
economies resulting in greater emissions, or local industry becoming
entrenched with older, less clean technology because the industry
would rather operate inefficiently than expose itself to price
volatility.29
Implementing restrictions on emissions in only one country or
region may result in emission intensive industries moving to
countries without a restriction, but developed countries often argue
that imposing a unilateral restriction on emissions forces a complete
transformation of an economy which has the potential of crippling
it.30 As a result, developed countries with high unemployment and a
need to maintain their market share in emission intensive industries
have become reluctant to unilaterally impose emission reduction
programs since that would likely create a risk that the companies
31
would move, severely harming the local economy.
C. Polluter Pays
Environmental taxes are justified by the "polluter pays" principle.32
As defined in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, the "polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment." 33 Developing countries note that
28. Emissions intensity is the level of emissions per dollar of goods produced.
For example, a $5,000 product resulting in five tons of CO2 emissions results in an
emissions intensity of $1,000 per ton of CO 2 emissions.
29. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 27, at 3.
30. DEP'T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION SCHEME
GREEN PAPER 27 (2008), http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf file/0004/
162688/CPRSGreenPaper - doc No_1.pdf.
31. ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 69 (2012).
32. M. Benjamin Eichenberg, Greenhouse Gas Regulation and Border Tax
Adjustments: The Carrot and the Stick, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 298
(2001).
33. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
2014] 343
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they should not have to put restrictions on their emissions output
because unrestricted emissions helped developed countries to
develop their economies, and as a result of legacy emissions, the
developed countries that previously polluted should be the ones to
pay.
Developing countries are concerned an international agreement
could lock them into a particular emissions level leading to perpetual
inequality.34 Developing countries also note that the majority of the
emissions put into the atmosphere over the past few decades were
because of developing countries, and therefore the developing
countries should not be the ones to mitigate damage already caused.3 5
Developing countries point to studies like one conducted for
Congress, where experts found that the United States emitted 24.6%
of the world total emissions, in second place, following China's
27.4% of total emissions.3 6 Additionally, the developed countries
such as the United States, Australia, and Canada rank in the top ten
of per capita emissions where Indonesia, India, and China are ranked
123, 156, and 98.37 However, China's emissions intensity is one of
the highest in the world, and over three times the level of emissions
intensity in the United States.38
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I, Principle 16
(Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/
aconfl5126-lannex1.htm.
34. WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 253.
35. Id. at 44.
36. Stratford Douglas & Shuichiro Nishioka, International Differences in
Emissions Intensity and Emissions Content of Global Trade, 99 J. DEV. EcoN. 415,
417-18, 418 tbl.1 (2012).
37. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 27, at 14-15.
38. Emissions intensity is calculated by taking a nation's GDP and dividing by
its GHG emissions. This provides a ratio of dollar of GDP produced per ton of
GHG (CO 2 equivalent) emissions. For further elaboration, see Part VI infra. The
implication being that a good produced in China and selling for a similar price as
that of a good produced in the United States, the Chinese good has multiple times
as much emissions associated with it compared to the U.S. produced good. If the
goal is to reduce total emissions, then it will be necessary to take the source and
how a good is produced into account.
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III. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Despite the slow progress the international community has made to
create a comprehensive plan, the community does agree that global
action is the best way to universally mitigate the foreseeable
damages. This desire to have a unified plan is exemplified in an
Australian study that stated: "[tihe first best solution to address the
competitive concerns of EITE [Energy Intensive Trade Exposed]
industries would be to develop a comprehensive global agreement
under which all major emitters have binding carbon constraints." 39
The international community's desire to create a comprehensive plan
was further reinforced by a study that found a failure to mitigate the
environment may reverse economic growth, especially in countries
whose economies are based in agriculture or other industries that do
not easily adapt to climate changes. 40 However, despite a strong
desire to have international cooperation, there has been little
progress, which has resulted in two international agreements and one
international promise that are stepping-stones to the world's full
potential.
A. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The first multinational agreement that addressed climate change
was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). Negotiations for the UNFCCC started in 1990 by the
United Nations General Assembly.41 It was then adopted in 1992 and
entered into force in 1994,42 and currently has 194 parties.43 The
UNFCCC was drafted and adopted in response to reports of rising
39. DEP'T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 30, at 292.
40. WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 39.
41. Issues in the Negotiating Process: A Brief History of the Climate Change
Process, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
cop7/issues/briefhistory.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
42. WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 234.
43. A Brief History of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL., available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/05/iisd-brief-
on-the-unfecc-process.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
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carbon levels.44 The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC was to
stabilize GHG emissions and minimize the effect anthropogenic
activities have on the climate; allowing for nature to absorb the
excess GHG emissions.4 5 The UNFCCC seeks to mitigate the climate
change through the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities found in Article 3, which states: "Parties should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take
the lead in combating climate change." 4 6 Therefore, the UNFCCC
seeks to have developed countries, or Annex I countries, do more to
reduce their emissions than the Non-Annex I countries.
The underlying tone of the UNFCCC is to promote economic
growth in an environmentally sustainable way through the principal
of common but differentiated responsibility. However, when a
tension between development and sustainability occurs, the
UNFCCC puts free trade and economic growth above the
environment, especially when the growth aids developing countries.47
Specifically, the UNFCCC states that "[m]easures taken to combat
climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade." 48 As will be addressed later in
context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the other
multilateral agreements, this perspective limits the effectiveness of
the document.
As the first multilateral framework to address climate change, the
UNFCCC has promoted international conversation exemplified in the
international and domestic rules and regulations promulgated in
44. Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 437,
440 (2007).
45. UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 2.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jisun Kim, The World Trade Organization and
Climate Change: Challenges and Options 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ.,
Working Paper No. 09-9, 2009).
48. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art 3.5.
[VOL. XXV
CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT
response. 49 The discourse sparked by the UNFCCC has further led to
50individual nations proposing a variety of unilateral responses.
Finally, this framework has become the reference for subsequent
multilateral discussions.
The UNFCCC, however, has not been effective in creating action
beyond discourse since it does not impose specific emission
reduction requirements for individual countries.51  The key
contribution of the UNFCCC, which has led to specific reduction
requirements in subsequent agreements, was dividing countries into
Annex I and Non-Annex Countries and laying the foundation for the
execution of the common but differentiated responsibility principle.52
However, the UNFCCC does not go beyond the general principles
that countries should have different responsibilities and all countries
should seek to mitigate damages, promote scientific research in this
area, and continue to engage in open dialogue. The UNFCCC
provided the guidance and structure to the Conference of the Parties
(COP) meetings by requiring quantitative data, such as updated
inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, and requiring different
measures of different countries based on ability and responsibility. 53
This has led to the creation of quantitative measures to help countries
mitigate climate change.54
B. Kyoto Protocol
1. Emission Reduction Requirements
In response to the COP meetings, the parties agreed for the COP's
third session to adopt the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.'" Furthering the
49. Emma L. Tompkins & Helene Amundsen, Perceptions of the Effectiveness
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Advancing
National Action on Climate Change, 11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2008).
50. Id. at 1.
51. See generally UNFCCC, supra note 2.
52. Id.
53. Background Documents: Framework Convention, MARY ROBINSON
FOUND.-CLIMATE JUSTICE, http://www.mrfcj.org/our-work/unfecc/background-
documents.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
54. Martin, supra note 44, at 440.
55. John H. Knox, The International Legal Framework for Addressing Climate
Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 135, 138 (2004).
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intent of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol required all parties that
ratified it to take steps to reduce emissions, support education and
research, and continue in dialogue. 56 Additionally, the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility continues in the Kyoto
Protocol since Non-Annex countries do not have a specified emission
reduction target. 7 The only universal requirement is for all countries
that ratify it to provide annual reports on how they are implementing
the emissions reductions.
The significant achievement in the Kyoto Protocol, which makes it
more progressive than the UNFCCC, is the requirements to mitigate
climate change, including the imposition of quantifiable emission
restrictions on Annex I countries in order to promote sustainable
development. 59 However, the drawback is that these restrictions are
only imposed on Annex I countries (forty-one parties classified as
industrialized (developed) countries and economies in transition
(EITs)).60 EITs are the former centrally planned economies of the
Soviet Union (Russia and Eastern Europe). 61 The Kyoto Protocol
seeks emission reductions for all Annex I countries and for
transitioning countries to reduce "their overall emissions of such
62
gases by at least five percent below 1990 levels in the commitment
period 2008 to 2012."63
56. WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 234.
57. Knox, supra note 55, at 138; Eichenberg, supra note 32, at 301.
58. Knox, supra note 55, at 141.
59. Kyoto Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. II, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1, 37 I.L.M. 22
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
60. Typically considered the developed countries such as the United Kingdom,
Japan, etc.
61. Edgar L. Feige, The Transition to a Market Economy in Russia: Property
Rights, Mass Privatization and Stabilization, in A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION,
PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 57 (Gregory S.
Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
62. The gases referred to include: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Knox, supra note
55, at 138.
63. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3.
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2. Flexibility Mechanisms
This emission reduction may be met either individually or jointly,
as long as the "anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of
the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned
amounts." 64 Due to this provision, Annex I countries had the ability
to work together to reduce emissions. Additional encouragement of
collaborative reductions is seen through the three flexibility
mechanisms allowed by the Kyoto Protocol for the countries who
have ratified the Protocol and are in good standing to reduce their
emissions trading. Countries may reduce emissions collaboratively
through emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean
development.65
Emissions trading has been a controversial component of the
Kyoto Protocol as it allows for countries to trade emissions in order
to claim a reduction in their emissions, in addition to domestic
reduction policies.66 Emissions trading occurs when one country buys
or sells excess emission credits from/to the other members.67 The
overarching purpose of emissions trading was to allow countries to
reduce their emissions in a cost-effective manner, and it fulfilled this
purpose in two ways. First, allowing the trading of emissions reduces
emissions at the lowest cost (in theory) when countries trade, and
second, allowing the trading resulted in the votes required to have the
Kyoto Protocol adopted. 68 As an illustration of how influential and
necessary this flexibility mechanism has become, the emissions
permit-trading market is now valued at two trillion U.S. dollars.69
64. Knox, supra note 55, at 138.
65. See The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the
Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/
mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
66. Martin, supra note 44, at 442-43.
67. Ibibia L. Worika & Thomas Wilde, Contractual Architecture for the Kyoto
Protocol: From Soft and Hard Laws to Concrete Commitments, 15 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 489, 492 (2000).
68. Martin, supra note 44, at 442. Commentaries have suggested that without
this provision, the Kyoto Protocol would not have been passed.
69. SARAI COSGROVE, THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE: 15TH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES-THE COPENHAGEN
PROTOCOL 4 (Asia-Pac. Model United Nations Conf., Background Paper A, 2009).
2014] 349
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The second method for countries to reduce their emissions is
through joint implementation. Joint implementation allows a country
to create a program that reduces emissions and gets emission credits
that can then be sold to others.70 The key component that
differentiates joint implementation from the clean development
mechanism addressed later is that joint implementation projects can
only be used by countries with emissions limitations or reduction
requirements. Therefore, the emissions trading through joint
implement may only be done between Annex I countries.72
The third mechanism that countries may use is the clean
development mechanism (CDM). 73 CDM allows a country that is
committed to reduce emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to create an
emission-reduction project in a developing country either with the
country directly or through firms and private actors.74 CDM allows
countries to give technological or financial advice to another country,
typically a developing country, and receive emission credit for
passing on clean energy technology and/or developing projects.7 5
CDM's goal was to help developing countries reach sustainable
development and reduce emissions.76 Since CDM serves two
beneficial purposes, it is likely the most successful of the three
flexibility mechanisms, but may not have actually reduced
emissions. As is clearly seen, the three flexibility mechanisms are
extremely beneficial in aiding countries to reduce their emissions.
70. The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Navigating
the Kyoto Project-Based Mechanisms, WORLD BANK, http://
einstitute.worldbank.org/ei/course/clean-development-mechanism-and-joint-
implementation-navigating-kyoto-project-based-mechanism (last visited Jan. 21,
2014) [hereinafter The Clean Development Mechanism].
71. Id.
72. Knox, supra note 55, at 140.
73. See Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.intlkyotoprotocol/mechanisms/
clean-development mechanism/items/2718.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
74. The Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 70.
75. Worika & Wilde, supra note 67, at 495.
76. Id. at 492.
77. What is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)?, GUARDIAN (July 26,
2011, 5:26 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/26/clean-
development-mechanism.
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However, these flexibility mechanisms may be taken away if a
country is not compliant with the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Impact of the Kyoto Protocol
The impact of the Kyoto Protocol is there in rhetoric, but is not as
apparent when looking at the global state of the climate and
continuously rising emissions. The Kyoto Protocol has not been as
influential as it could have been in part because two of the world's
leading polluters, Australia and the United States, did not sign it.78
The rationale for the United States and Australia's refusal to ratify it
is that it is a flawed document79 in that developing countries,
including China and India, do not have a requirement to reduce
emissions.so However, the absence of the United States alone means
that the global emissions base level is missing thirty-six percent of
the emitted GHG in 1990, which is the year off of which the
reduction requirements of the Protocol is based.81 As such, the
emissions reductions can only be as good as the amount of countries
participating in the Kyoto Protocol.
4. Enforcement of Kyoto Protocol
Additionally, the influence of the Protocol has not reached full
potential because of the lack of enforcement for violators. Despite the
seemingly hardline approach presented, the implementation of the
Protocol emission reduction has not been overly successful for two
reasons. Enforcement is challenging because Article 3.1 of the
Protocol does not state how the countries should meet their
commitments; and the three flexibility mechanisms make
enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol difficult. 82 Without clear guidance
on how to meet the requirements, and the availability of mechanisms
78. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/
status of ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
79. PBS Newshour: Kyoto Fallout (PBS television broadcast Feb. 16, 2005),
transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/jan-june05/
kyoto 2-16.html.
80. Id.
81. Knox, supra note 55, at 142.
82. Id. at 139.
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that help to avoid hard reduction choices, Annex I countries
compliance becomes subjective and Non-Annex I countries
compliance results in only self-accountability.
Enforcement is also minimal due to the lack of legal authority the
member parties have against one another. In response, the countries
have drafted an enforcement procedure to create legitimacy in
enforcement through an expert panel and through an enforcement
procedure. The process ensures that penalties are not imposed
without due process. The first preliminary safeguard to protect
against non-compliance is the expert panel created to assess the
countries' compliance, which is given as a report to the Secretariat
and circulated among the parties.83 The information gathered by the
expert panel can then be reviewed and addressed at the upcoming
COP meeting.84
In addition to the expert panel, which provides an accounting of
the countries activities, Article 18 states that the parties shall come up
with "appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to
determine and to address cases of non-compliance." 85 Parties agreed
to implement a two-branch procedure to ensure compliance: a
facilitative branch and an enforcement branch. 86 The facilitative
branch provides technical and financial advice, and the enforcement
branch can make a declaration of non-compliance and impose
sanctions to prevent non-compliant countries from using flexibility
mechanisms if it does not reform.8 7
Finally, if the compliance branch cannot compel a party to comply
with the emissions reductions, Article 19 of the Kyoto Protocol states
that parties may bring disputes under Article 14 of the UNFCCC,8 8
which states that parties may choose to arbitrate disputes through
either negotiation or litigation.89 The only concrete requirement
under Article 14 is that countries must submit to the International
83. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 59, art. 8.3.
84. Id.
85. Id. art. 18.
86. Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, An Outlook for the Non-Compliance Mechanism
of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 2 AMSTERDAM L. F., no.2, 2010, at 77,
available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/view/133/255.
87. Id.
88. Knox, supra note 55, at 142.
89. UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 14.
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Court of Justice's jurisdiction. 90 As such, when looking at the whole
of the Kyoto Protocol, enforcing compliance is difficult since the
autonomy of the countries is supreme, especially since countries may
legally withdraw from Kyoto at any point as will be illustrated later
in the paper.91
C. Comparison between UNFCCC and Kyoto
Kyoto clearly follows the UNFCCC in prioritizing economic
growth above sustainability, as illustrated in the statement that
"Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and
measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse
effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on
international trade . . . and economic impacts on other Parties." 92
Therefore, countries are still limited to implementing emission
reduction measures that are guaranteed not to harm global trade, even
if the climate change may not be effectively mitigated as a
consequence.
Another similarity between the UNFCCC and Kyoto is the
continuation of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. 93 Emission reduction levels are determined by the
country's emissions level in 1990 for developed countries, whereas
transitional countries may have a base year of 1988 or 1989.94 The
difference in emission reduction and base years creates a range of
restrictions-requiring the United States, if it had ratified Kyoto, to
reduce emissions by thirty percent, compared to New Zealand, which
is not required to reduce emissions at all, and Former Soviet Union
(FSU) countries, including Russia, that were allotted significant
90. Id.
91. Canada became the first country that had ratified the Kyoto Protocol to
withdraw because it would have faced "crippling fines." Canada to Withdraw from
Kyoto Protocol, BBC (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:01 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-us-canada- 16151310.
92. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 59, art. 2.3.
93. See Jeffrey McGee & Ros Taplin, The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate: A Retreat from the Principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities?, 5 McGILL INT'L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y
11 (2009).
94. Knox, supra note 55, at 139.
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quantities of "hot air" to trade.95 This "hot air" was created by the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and resulting economic collapse,
leading to significant reductions in emissions. The FSU countries
were allowed to maintain the old quotas and therefore the illusion
that they had significant credits to trade.
The key difference between the two agreements is the quantifiable
emission reduction requirements that Kyoto presents, compared to
the conceptual approach found in the UNFCCC. Although this is a
significant difference between the two agreements, the emission
reduction requirements are less influential due to the ability of
countries to leave the Kyoto if the sanctions are too high, as seen
through Canada's actions. However, despite the softened impact of
Kyoto, it has been a step towards reaching the goals of reducing
GHGs.
D. Agreements after Kyoto: Durban Platform
Kyoto's original commitment period to reduce emissions was set to
end in 2012.96 Because of this, the majority of the recent international
focus has been on how to continue to implement emission reduction
requirements on member countries now that the commitment period
has ended. The most recent measure to continue the international
cooperation is the Durban Platform. The Durban Platform, created
during COP 17, led to two significant steps toward continuing the
Kyoto Protocol. 97 During the Durban Platform, the parties stated that
they would adopt a universal legal document on climate change no
later than 2015.98 The drafting of the document will be done through
the creation of an ad hoc working group. This group issued their first
report in July of 2012, which stated that the officials were elected and
95. Appendix I: Quantified Economy- Wide Emissions Targets for 2020, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/
copenhagen dec_2009/items/5264.php (last visited Jan 19, 2012).
96. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3.1.
97. Soledad Aguilar et al., Summary of the Durban Climate Change
Conference: 28 November- 1 December 2011, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL.,
no. 534 (Dec. 13, 2011), at 1, http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12534e.pdf.
98. Durban Conference Delivers Breakthrough in International Community's
Response to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/
site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/Durban (last visited Jan. 22,
2014).
[VOL. XXV
CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT
break-out groups were created.99 Nothing further on the record has
been done in the drafting of the next international agreement,
creating a presumption that the agreement may not be complete
within the deadline.
The second part of the Durban Platform is the agreement to
prolong the Kyoto commitments for a second term as a patch to
continue international emission reduction for the next few years.1oo
The second commitment period will last from 2013 to 2017, with
countries submitting target proposals in the beginning of
2013.10'Although the international community decided to extend
Kyoto to a second commitment, no requirement exists for countries
to either ratify or continue into the second phase. Therefore, not only
will the United States continue to abstain from the protocol, Canada,
Japan, and Russia have all stated that they will not join the second
commitment period.102 As China, India, and Brazil were never
included under Kyoto, the result is that several of the world's largest
emitters will therefore not be subject to any sort of emissions
reductions.
E. Effectiveness of the Multilateral Agreements
When analyzing the totality of the multilateral documents and the
impact each one brings, the effectiveness in reducing carbon
emissions becomes unclear. Clearly, the UNFCCC and subsequent
documents have increased the general knowledge about climate
change and created new regulations, both internationally as well as
domestically. Additionally, multilateral agreements are commonly
accepted and the international pressure of the documents has
99. Id.
100. Brian Gordon, The UNFCCC's Durban Platform Explained, HOLMAN
FENWICK WILLAN (2012), http://www.hfw.com/The-UNFCCC (last visited Feb.
19, 2014).
101. Policy Brief Australia and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol, CLIMATE
INST., http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/ resources/tci_kyotoprotocol
policybrief mar2012 file.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
102. Kyoto Deal Loses Four Big Nations, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 29,
2011, http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/kyoto-deal-loses-four-
big-nations-20110528-1 f9dk.html.
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provided "an additional incentive to act domestically to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions." 103
However, despite the increase in dialogue that has stemmed from
the multilateral agreements, none of the agreements have
enforcement powers that make other countries accountable for their
actions.104 The multilateral agreements have been a stepping-stone,
but many countries have moved towards unilateral actions because
they can impose quantifiable standards on themselves.
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR UNILATERAL ACTION
Due to the questionable effectiveness of the multilateral
agreements, as well as the pressure to continue emissions reductions
past what the agreements have originally stipulated, many countries
have started to move towards unilateral action. As an example, the
European Union has implemented a European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme, which operates as a cap-and-trade system, for the
twenty-eight European Union states in addition to Iceland, Norway,
and Liechtenstein.1 0 5 This paper will now address the two unilateral
actions most commonly proposed in the United States, a cap-and-
trade program and a carbon tax, before addressing the innovative
Carbon Tax with Reinvestment (CTR) as a border tax adjustment and
is the third and superior option.106
Unilateral action is rationalized through the need for national
authorities to encourage the internalization of environmental costs,
especially since market forces and private actors will not willingly
reduce their profitability to adjust for environmental costs. 107
Unilateral actions internalize GHG emissions, which are a negative
externality that create adverse effects on third parties.108
103. Tompkins & Amundsen, supra note 49, at 4.
104. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 14.
105. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUR. COMMISSION, http://
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index en.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2014). Cap-
and-trade will be addressed further on in the paper in depth.
106. See generally Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-
and-Trade, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580 (2013).
107. See Eichenberg, supra note 32, at 298.
108. Negative Externalities, ECON. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/
Market failures/Externalities.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
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When examining all of the goods and services offered in the
marketplace, the fair market value should be higher when considering
externality costs of emissions on others and future generations. 109
The purpose of a carbon tax and, to a lesser extent, a cap-and-trade
program is to take into account these negative externalities and
increase the price of the good or service to account for this negative
external cost. In so doing, goods or service costs are placed on the
individual purchasing the item, and, because the cost is higher, they
may then consume less or switch to other products or services that
are less expensive (and that have a smaller impact on the
environment). When nations impose a unilateral measure, they are
internalizing an externality into the price of goods and services,
resulting in a price that includes its true cost to society. 110
Understanding the justification for a tax allows individuals to think
about both the benefits and drawbacks of imposing a unilateral
action. Given the limited reach multilateral agreements have in
affecting dramatic change, two primary domestic policies have been
proposed to reduce emissions within the borders of a nation. Both
have benefits and drawbacks, and neither are the most efficient
mechanism for reducing emissions from both an effectiveness and
legal perspective.
V. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION REGULATIONS
Unilateral action may be more efficient, but it must ensure
compliance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and
regulations, specifically the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to be accepted in an international forum. The purpose of the
WTO is "to help trade flow as freely as possible-so long as there
are no undesirable side-effects" on a global level."' The fundamental
principle of the WTO is to ensure trade neutrality by encouraging
109. Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2009).
110. Robert H. Frank, Heads, You Win. Tails, You Win, Too., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/business/pigovian-taxes-may-offer-
economic-hope.html.
111. What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact1 e.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2014).
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free-market principles, regardless of the possibility that the free trade
principles may impede a country's action to protect the
environment.112 Any unilateral action needs to be drafted in a manner
that encourages free trade while mitigating climate change, given that
the WTO was created to foster free trade, not to promote a cleaner
environment, and will therefore not give much deference to
environmental proposals that could harm free trade.113
Conservation and environmental issues had no role in the creation
of GATT in 1947, as its goal was free trade, and this primary purpose
of trade was carried forward into the WTO regime.114 The WTO did
acknowledge in the Marrakesh Agreement the importance of
sustainable development as well as free trade. 15 However, despite
the acknowledgment, the WTO mitigates damage by seeking to
increase the world's standard of living, rendering the harm caused by
climate change to be compensated by improved standard of
livings. 116 Consequently, despite the statement that the WTO will
recognize the need to ensure environmental sustainability, there are
still numerous legal requirements a unilateral action must comply
with that heavily favor free trade.
A. Most Favored Nation
In Article I of GATT, the WTO promotes free trade through the
most favored nation clause.' The Article states that any charge or
112. Eichenberg, supra note 32, at 306.
113. Hufbauer & Kim, supra note 47, at 1.
114. See generally Tilman Santarius et al., Balancing Trade and Environment:
An Ecological Reform of the WTO as a Challenge in Sustainable Global
Governance, WUPPERTAL INST. FOR CLIMATE, ENV'T, ENERGY (2004), http://
www.wupperinst.org/globalisierung/pdf global/balancing trade.pdf.
115. Id. at 2. The Marrakesh Agreement states: "The Parties to this Agreement,
[r]ecognizing that their relations ... should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living . . . in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment . . . ."
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. The Marrakesh
Agreement later goes on to establish the Committee on Trade and Environment,
which carries out technical work.
116. Eichenberg, supra note 32, at 306-07.
117. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1.1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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payment for an import or export granted by one contracting party
"shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties."' This is one of the fundamental components of
the agreement. GATT requires countries to adopt this provision on a
multilateral basis, meaning that as countries ratify GATT, all
countries will be put on an equal basis rather than a unilateral basis,
thereby ensuring that discrimination is less likely to occur. 119 For
purposes of this paper, all like products must be treated the same by a
country, irrespective of where it was produced.120
This provision is meant to prevent any discrimination between
different countries for two reasons. First GATT wanted to ensure that
it was not legal to discriminate against another country; secondly,
discrimination tends to distort economic and market forces. 121
Therefore, this is a fundamental rule to requiring strict adherence. For
purposes of this paper, as will be discussed below with each proposed
unilateral action, countries must be cognizant of not being able to
discriminate against another country, even if the unilateral action
would fit within one of the exceptions.
B. National Treatment
The second provision in GATT requires parties to comply with
unilateral actions in ensuring national treatment on internal taxation
and regulation. Article III states that "products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable [sic] than that
accorded to like products of national origin . ... 22 No tax that is in
excess of those imposed either directly or indirectly to domestic like
product will be allowed under this Article. 123
118. Id.
119. Paul Missios & Halis Murat Yildiz, The Role ofMFN Under Asymmetries in
Environmental Standards, 93 EcoN. LETTERS 297, 302 (2006).
120. Eichenberg, supra note 32, at 304.
121. Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Economic and Legal Aspects of the
Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 17 EUR. J. POL. EcoN. 233, 234 (2001).
122. GATT, supra note 117, art. 3.4.
123. WTO Analytical Index: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic index
e/gattl994_02_e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
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The purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionist measures
imposed by countries.124 Clearly, this aligns with the WTO's purpose
of promoting free trade, and is favorably looked upon as
reasonable-a country cannot unilaterally impose a tax on emissions
coming in from another higher emitting country. Article III does
speak to unilateral measures that apply only to the country imposing
the tax, but in light of the aforementioned discussion on economic
viability concerns from Annex I countries, the imposition of solely an
internal tax, which does not touch imports, is extremely unlikely. 125
Article 3.2 does address the possibility of a tax that is imposed on
both internal and imported goods and services,126 meaning that
Article 3.2 allows an internal tax to be imposed on imports if it
satisfies the following requirements. 127 Inferring from the language
that "products . .. of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes ... in excess of those applied, directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products,"l28 a country can impose a tax
on imports. The key in complying with Article III is that a unilateral
action will not be deemed to be protectionist if the internal tax is
applied to both domestic and foreign like goods and services that are
imported.
Article 3.4 further imposes a restriction on the inability to treat a
foreign product differently than a domestic product after clearing
customs.129 This Article is meant to ensure that protectionist
measures do not occur once the product is within a country, and free
market economic principles can continue when goods are within a
nation's borders. Therefore, once a good has cleared customs, it
cannot have special restrictions placed on its movement or price in
reaching a consumer.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. GATT, supra note 117, art. 3.2.
127. Christian Pitschas, GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustment and the
Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and
Energy, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 486 (1995).
128. GATT, supra note 117, art. 3.2.
129. John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Barriers,
10 MICH J. INT'L L. 207, 211 (1989).
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This Article becomes a valuable restriction because countries may
not arbitrarily discriminate against another country's goods and
services, even if it is believed that the other country is not doing its
"fair share" to reduce emissions. While beneficial to world trade, this
limits the ability to create accountability between the different
countries and encourage other countries to reduce their emissions.
However, GATT does allow for a charge or tax that is equal to an
internal tax to be imposed on imported products.130 This is a
beneficial tool for countries to use when there is a desire to impose a
tax on carbon emissions. The ability to impose a tax that is equivalent
to an internal tax is critical to the concept of a carbon tax that
reinvests revenues. This will be addressed later in this paper.
C. Article XX
The last WTO provision is a concession given to countries to help
them justify an environmental act. Article XX of GATT states that as
long as measures are "relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources" and are not imposed in an arbitrary or unjustified
manner equivalent to a disguised restriction on international trade,
they may be allowed.131 One key expansion in this exception is that a
country can now impose internal restrictions that apply to natural
132-resources located outside its jurisdiction. For purposes of this
paper, this means that the United States may impose a restriction on
GHG emissions that are emitted outside the United States and still
comply with GATT. Article XX has been broadened in past cases, as
illustrated above, but has also been construed extremely narrowly in
many circumstances.133 In order to qualify under this exception, a
multi-faceted two-pronged test must be met. Therefore, for an
environmental act to qualify under Article XX, the measure must
satisfy both the chapeau of the Article and the applicable
-134
exception.
130. Id. at 214.
131. GATT, supra note 117, art. 20(g).
132. Gentile, supra note 18, at 208.
133. PETER VAN DEN BoSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 618 (2006).
134. Brett Grosko, Note, Just When Is It that a Unilateral Trade Ban Satisfies the
GATT?: The WTO Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, 5 ENVTL. L. 817, 828
(1999).
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1. Fit within the Framework of the Exception
The first step is to ensure that the proposed unilateral action fits
within one of the exceptions. First, the measure must either be
necessary to conserve natural resources or protect the environment. 135
This step does not look at the reasoning of the law, but rather seeks to
ensure that the law addresses136 the correct exception; in this paper, it
would be preserving an exhaustible natural resource.137 By doing so,
the WTO no longer analyzes the justifiability of the provisions, but
merely limits the analysis to whether the law reasonably meets one of
the exceptions. 13 8 Once the law meets the exception, it must then
additionally fulfill the chapeau requirements.
2. Chapeau Requirement
The chapeau seeks to ensure that free trade is still protected, even
if the environment may impose some limitations. The chapeau states
that any unilateral proposal must not be imposed in a way that is
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination ... or a disguised restriction
on international trade."1 39 The intention of the chapeau is to ensure
that the enumerated exceptions cannot be abused and that free trade
principles are still promoted, while recognizing the need to protect
climate change. 140
3. Comprehensive Application
These protections ensure that a law meets the requisite
requirements and is therefore determined to not be arbitrary or
discriminatory. In order to comply under sub-section g, a law must be
made "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
135. Gentile, supra note 18, at 203.
136. Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development?: An Analysis of the
WTO Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade
Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1129, 1158 (1999).
137. In this paper, the exception will always be sub-paragraph g: "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural recourses if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT,
supra note 117, art. 20(g).
138. Gentile, supra note 18, at 203.
139. GATT, supra note 117, art. 20.
140. Gentile, supra note 18, at 210.
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consumption."1 4 1 This links back to Article III, which allows a tax to
be imposed on foreign imports as long as it does not exceed an
internal tax. The rationale relates to the fundamental principles of the
WTO, i.e., promoting international trade and prohibiting
protectionism. As long as a measure imposes the burden on both the
country implementing the policy and foreign countries, the WTO
does not appear to be as concerned with a tax.142
4. Universal Communication
Concurrent with the overarching policy, the WTO will apply a
more exhaustive look at unilateral actions under Article XX when
imposed unilaterally and without multilateral discussions. 143 This has
never been explicitly stated in an analysis of Article XX by the WTO
or in the chapeau itself.144 Although the WTO Appellate Body's
appears to avoid explicitly stating their requirement, in a court case
challenging the Endangered Species Act, the Appellate Body
identified why multilateral negotiations are required prior to the
imposition of a good faith unilateral action in order to be acceptable
to the WTO. 145
First, the Appellate Body explained that undertaking serious
negotiations with some countries, but not others, may be unjustifiably
discriminatory.146 Secondly, failure to undertake serious negotiations
with affected parties may point to the discriminatory effects as a
disguised restriction on free trade, and as unjustifiable
discrimination.147 Therefore, a country seeking to impose a unilateral
action should engage in conversations with all parties that may be
affected by the proposal as a safeguard.
141. GATT, supra note 117, art. 20(g).
142. See generally Ala'i, supra note 136.
143. See generally Gentile, supra note 18.
144. Id. at 214.
145. See APPELLATE BODY REPORT, UNITED STATES-IMPORT PROHIBITION OF
CERTAIN SHRIMP AND SHRIMP PRODUCTS, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abrw e.pdf.
146. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A
New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 491, 507 (2002).
147. Id.
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The need for negotiations, however, is an area for which the
Appellate Body of the WTO has continually adjusted its position. For
example, although there is a strong presumption that a country needs
to engage in negotiation before engaging in unilateral action, the
appellate court has found that there is "no duty to 'consult' or
'negotiate' with respect to measures taken" when imposing a
unilateral action.148 For the remainder of this paper, it is important to
bear in mind that for a unilateral proposal to comply with the WTO
Article XX, the country should engage in serious negotiations before
imposing a unilateral action in order to be safe. Clearly, Article XX
makes a good safety net when imposing a unilateral action that seeks
to preserve exhaustible natural resources, but the best option is to
ensure compliance with the other GATT regulations in order for the
unilateral action to be effective.
VI. UNILATERAL PROPOSALS
The following proposals are the most commonly accepted and
introduced methods for curtailing GHG emissions through unilateral
action. The first two proposals addressed, cap-and-trade and carbon
taxes, have been suggested through a variety of forums. The third is
an innovative new proposal using a carbon tax that creates emissions
certainty while being in legal compliance with the WTO.
A. Cap-and-Trade
1. What Is a Cap-and-Trade Program?
A cap-and-trade program is a market regulation mechanism for
reducing carbon emissions, and is created through a government-
regulated program.149 The typical program consists of two parts: a
cap on the amount of emissions that can be produced, and the ability
for entities to trade their emission credits if they need more emissions
or want to profit from their excess credits.1o It is considered a
148. Gentile, supra note 18, at 216.
149. Miles Young, Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an Effective Cap-
and-Trade Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2009 BYU L. REV.
1379, 1395 (2009).
150. Yvonne Gross, Kyoto, Congress, or Bust: The Constitutional Invalidity of
State CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 205, 207 (2005).
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market-based mechanism because GHG emission producers have an
incentive to reduce their emissions more quickly and then sell their
- - - -151
credits in order to maximize their gains.
This method enables polluters who know that they will exceed
their emission credits to purchase additional credits from low
emitters at a market-traded price. Therefore, cap-and-trade increases
the incentive to minimize the amount of emissions produced, but also
does not have to impose penalties since the market will regulate
when an emission producer is unable to afford purchasing additional
emission credits. Through this system, emission producers have an
incentive to improve technology.152 The disadvantage is that the
technological advances may not happen, leading to either expanded
emissions or shutting down the economy. Alternatively, the
allocation of credits may exceed actual emissions resulting in a price
collapse, as experienced both with the sulfur market for acid rainl53
and with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS).154
2. Cap-and-Trade's Compliance with the WTO
Most cap-and-trade programs focus on domestic measures and
domestic GHG emitters. However, any effective cap-and-trade
program will need to include imported emissions; otherwise, carbon
leakage15 5 will occur unchecked. Due to this concern, all three of the
U.S. proposed billS156 have attempted to address the international
legal requirements through including an international allowance pool
151. Young, supra note 149, at 1395.
152. Id. at 1399.
153. Mark Peters, Changes Choke Cap-and-Trade Market, WALL ST. J. (July 12,
2010, 12:01 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052748704258604575360821005676554.
154. ETS, RIP?: The Failure to Reform Europe's Carbon Market Will
Reverberate around the World, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013, available at http://
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576388-failure-reform-
europes-carbon-market-will-reverberate-round-world-ets.
155. Carbon leakage is the term assigned to industry moving from one nation to
another to avoid carbon limits, thereby bypassing a cap-and-trade system that does
not include imports or contain a Border Tax Adjustment (BTA).
156. See Bingaman-Specter Bill, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); Lieberman-
Warner Bill, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007); Manager's Amendment to the
Lieberman-Warner Bill, S. 3036, 110th Cong. (2007).
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provision. 15 The proposed bills require an international emitter to
either purchase an allowance from this international pool, or produce
some sort of other evidence that they have an allowance.15 8 If an
allowance is required to be purchased from a pool, the bills must then
determine whether the international allowances would be a separate
pool or part of the domestic allowances. 159
As none of those legislative efforts has resulted in law, this part of
the regulations is still under negotiation and development, leading to
a variety of different outcomes in determining whether they comply
with WTO regulations. First, if the international pool is different
from the domestic pool, then the international pool must have a
similar set of procedures as the domestic allowances procedure. To
be in compliance with GATT Article 3.2, the international pool
charge cannot be in excess of the charge imposed on domestic
emissions. 160 In essence, this simply requires both domestic and
international allowances to be purchased at the same price.
The more difficult provision for the cap-and-trade program to
comply with is that the international allowances may not receive less
favorable treatment than those of national origin.161 This means
international allowances should be as easy to acquire as domestic
allowances. This creates a tension in either making all allowances
extremely easy to get, leaving the cap-and-trade program less
effective, or having a stringent cap-and-trade program with few
allowances and potentially shocking the global economic system.
While a proposal for how to resolve that tension is beyond the scope
of this paper, the author proposes that a possible workable method is
to redesign cap-and-trade to be based on emissions intensity.162
157. KENNETH R. RICHARDS & STEPHANIE HAYES RICHARDS, THE EVOLUTION
AND ANATOMY OF RECENT CLIMATE CHANGE BILLS IN THE U.S. SENATE: CRITIQUE
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368903.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. GATT, supra note 117, art. 3.2.
161. Id. art. 3.4.
162. If cap-and-trade was based on emissions intensity, it would potentially be
possible to accumulate all domestic and imported emissions on all goods and
services and require end users to purchase emission permits to acquire goods and
services.
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Finally, the cap-and-trade program may be able to qualify under
Article XX exceptions for seeking to preserve an exhaustible natural
resource. 163 Although a cap-and-trade program will likely fall under
the auspices of Article XX (g), the United States must be able to
demonstrate that the bill is not a disguised restriction on trade. 164 This
may be difficult since the international allowances will likely have
something that differentiates them in a way that can be construed as
arbitrary discrimination. Furthermore, since the cap-and-trade
program allows domestic companies to continue production and
potentially profit from the system, the WTO will seek to ensure that
the United States is not subtlety aiding domestic companies. A cap-
and-trade program passed into law needs to comply with GATT.
3. Advantages of a Cap-and-Trade Program
a. Flexibility of the Cap-and-Trade
First, the cap-and-trade program provides flexibility in its
implementation. The government is free to decide how it is
implemented. For example, the scope of the program may vary, from
emissions resulting from one GHG or from all GHG emissions.165
Furthermore, the government can decide to regulate emissions
upstream, regulating energy sources, or downstream by potentially
regulating consumers, or anywhere in between.166
Additionally, the government may decide how to initially structure
the program to minimize the shock emitters' face by either auctioning
only a portion of the emissions or handing out emission credits for
free. Typically, initial allowances are given out after an assessment of
the industry.167 These allowances are given out for free or for
minimal cost, as a way for the government to help the industry
absorb the shock of the program, and the price of the allowance may
gradually increase.
163. Id. art. 20(g).
164. Id.
165. Richards & Richards, supra note 157, at 30.
166. Id.
167. A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., EMIsSIONs TRADING IN THE U.S.:
EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 4 (Pew
Ctr. on Global Climate Change, 2003), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/
emissions trading.pdf.
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Another option for the government is to gradually take away
emission requirements in order to provide a dual incentive where
allowance holders want to maximize the immediate market incentive
as well and keep the market incentive going when the allowances are
reduced. Once the allowances have been initially distributed, then the
trading may occur between the parties, since the cap-and-trade's
purpose is to reduce overall emissions irrespective of the specific
parties that reduce their emissions. 168
b. Political Platform
Another advantage of the cap-and-trade program is that it is a good
political platform on which to stand. Americans are tax adverse, and
therefore any mention of an additional tax is a difficult proposal for a
politician. However, cap-and-trade programs can be proposed on the
platform that the allowances will be auctioned off to emitters, and
therefore the program will only raise revenue for the government. 169
Second, politicians can point to the already successfully implemented
sulfur cap-and-trade program, as will be described below.
c. Quantity Certainty
The primary advantage of the cap-and-trade scheme is supposed to
be that the level of emissions is known as a certainty. This, in theory,
facilitates the debate on how to reduce emissions to avoid
catastrophic climate change, thereby ensuring that no excess
emissions are allowed to be produced. However, as noted
immediately below, given the uncertainty in forecasting emissions, it
may be the case that cap-and-trade does not produce the certainty
expected.
4. Disadvantages of a Cap-and-Trade Program
Despite the many advantages stated, especially by politicians, the
cap-and-trade program has numerous drawbacks. First, the statement
that the allowances of a cap-and-trade program will be auctioned off
168. Id.
169. GILBERT E. METCALF ET AL., ANALYSIS OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS TAX
PROPOSALS 3 (2008), http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC
Rptl60.pdf.
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to raise revenue is often at least partially false. The most common
method for initially implementing a cap-and-trade program is to give
at least some portion of the allowances out free of charge. Therefore,
the government either raises little or no revenue. Second, there can be
extreme price volatility in the implementation of the program,
especially when industries are worried about shortages and those
worries affect the emissions trading market. 170
Arguably, the biggest domestic disadvantage, however, is the cost
of administration. Implementing a cap-and-trade program means
answering questions, such as how many allowances should be
provided, should allowances be distributed, what type of certification
program should be in place, how should allowance reductions occur
in the future, what the business plan should be for those decisions,
and how long should the allowances should last. Those worries are
only with how to implement the program. After implementation,
additional questions arise as to how to enforce the program, what
sanctions should apply, market regulation, and how revenue is
spent. 172
Finally, one of the hurdles that any cap-and-trade program must
overcome is the question of compliance with the WTO regulations in
GATT. Although Article XX is a viable option for any cap-and-trade
program, the United States would have difficulty in overcoming the
still stringent arbitrary discrimination question, as examined above.
Therefore, for the reasons provided above, a cap-and-trade program
is likely not the most effective proposal, both from an efficiency
perspective and a legal perspective.
5. Examples of Cap-and-Trade Programs
a. Acid Rain Program
The United States implemented a cap-and-trade program to fight
acid rain. The objective was to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide,
170. Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax Is Better than Cap
and Trade, 124 TAx NOTES 1257 (2009).
171. Young, supra note 149, at 1400.
172. Gary Bryner, Reducing Greenhouse Gases through Carbon Market, 85
DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 969 (2008).
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which causes sulfur rain.173 For this program, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) both issued and auctioned off
allowances. 174 Because of this program, sulfur dioxide emissions
were forty-one percent lower in 2002 than in 1980. Despite the
success claimed, however, the program did not fix everything.
Research shows that acid rain continues to affect lakes and streams,
and some argue that the initial cap set by the program was too
small. 176 Additionally, since trading opened for the scheme, prices
volatility has been much higher than stock volatility, reducing the
efficiency of this policy instrument.1 77 The implementation of this
program illustrates that while it is possible to implement a cap-and-
trade program and to manage it successfully, unless continued to be
carefully managed, it can fail with resulting price volatility and
questionable progress towards reducing real emissions.
And fail it did. Once a successful market, it suddenly began to fail
when the EPA decided to expand the market with the introduction of
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) to regulate fine particulate
emissions associated with sulfur dioxide released from power plants
178in 2005. In order to successfully meet the EPA's requirements for
sulfur dioxide and reduce emissions in the past, utilities switched
from Eastern coal (anthracite, high sulfur, high heat content) to
Western coal (bituminous, low sulfur, low heat content). Using
technological advances in energy production and the resulting shale
173. Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain Program: Key Insights from the
Design, Operation, and Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade Program, ELECTRICITY J.,
Aug.-Sept. 2007, at 47, 48.
174. Id. at 49.
175. CLEAN AIR MARKET PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP AND
TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM RESULTS 1, http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade/
documents/ctresults.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
176. Bryner, supra note 172, at 971.
177. See Samuel Fankhauser et al., Combining Multiple Climate Policy
Instruments: How Not to Do It, Climate Change Economics (Ctr. for Climate
Change Econ. and Policy & Grantham Research Inst. on Climate Change & the
Env't, Working Paper No. 38, 2010), http://www.1se.ac.uk/Granthamlnstitute/
publications/WorkingPapers/Papers/WPapers30-39/WP38_UK-carbon-tax.pdf;
Waggoner, supra note 170.
178. Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/cair (last updated Mar. 20, 2013).
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gale, 179 utilities further reduced emissions by switching energy
sources from coal to natural gas. Concerned about older coal plants
producing electricity, the EPA introduced a new policy in 2011; the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR).1 So This changed the
number of allowances surrendered for each ton of sulfur dioxide
emission and resulted in successful court challenges. As a result of
CSAPR, switching energy sources and severely limiting allowance
trading collapsed the market.1 82 See Figure 1 for the price history of
sulfur dioxide emission allowance prices. From a peak of over $1,600
a ton in 2010, the market traded under three dollars per ton in
2013.183
179. Natural Gas Resources: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Natural
Res., 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113shrg80132/html/CHRG-113shrg80132.htm.
180. Interstate Air Pollution Transport, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/airtransport (last updated Jan. 9, 2014).
18 1. Matthew L. Wald, Court Blocks E.P.A. Rule on Cross-State Pollution, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/science/
earth/appeals-court-strikes-down-epa-rule-on-cross-state-pollution.html? r=0;
Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System:
The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment (MIT Ctr. for Energy and Envtl.
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2012-012, 2012), http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/
www/publications/workingpapers/2012-012.pdf.
182. Gary D. Libecap, The Cap-and-Trade Bust, DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 10,
2013), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/
144216.
183. Mark Peters, Changes Choke Cap-and-Trade Market, WALL ST. J., July 12,
2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704258604575360821005676554.html.
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Figure 1: Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Pricesl84
b. EU-ETS System
To comply with the Kyoto Protocol and reduce GHG emissions,
the European Union launched the EU-ETS. The implementation
occurred in conjunction with the acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol
and had two phases.' 85 Many of the allowances were given freely at
implementation, and some were auctioned off. 186 The scope of the
ETS was limited to the European Union countries to help satisfy the
Kyoto reduction requirements, and was limited to carbon emissions
emitted domestically. 87 The EU-ETS scheme is compulsory, covers
all twenty-seven European Union countries (EU-27), is structured to
reduce emissions by 1.74% annually, and covers more than 11,000
power stations and industrial plants, as shown in Figure 2.
184. Gary D. Libecap, The Cap-and-Trade Bust, DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 10,
2013), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/144216.
185. RAYMOND Kopp, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 1 (2007), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/
RFF-CTst 07-Kopp.pdf
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Figure 2: EU-27/EU-ETS Carbon Trading Participating
-188
Region
EU CARBON TRADING
a The scheme is compulsory
for all 27 EU countnes ar four
others. erae
a Emissions cap decreases,
. Allowances are auct oned or
given away.
z More than -1,000 power
-are inckltded
Having limited carbon emissions to domestic emissions, in order
for the EU-27 to quickly pass the legislation and create a
marketplace, the European Union's limited scope rule was missing
important provisions. An earlier draft included the "Future
Allowance Import Requirement" which intended to impose a border
tax adjustment (BTA) on emissions from countries that did not have
a comparable credit or were not reducing emissions to comply with
Kyoto.189 However, that provision did not make it into the final draft,
and therefore, the final version did not address imports. Even with
significant regulations in place, the EU-ETS did not fall under
international scrutiny until recently when the scope of the program
was broadened to affect other countries.
The EU-ETS program became controversial when the Aviation
Directive was included in the scheme in January 2012, requiring all
188. Alex Scott, EU Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme in Freefall, CHEMICAL
& ENGINEERING NEWS, Feb. 18, 2013, at 16, 16-20, available at
http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/i7/EU-Carbon-Emissions-Trading-Scheme.html.
189. HARRO VAN ASSELT, ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES:
SUPPORTING EUROPEAN CLIMATE POLICY 66 (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
Project No. 018476-GOCE) (2009).
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airlines, irrespective of country of origin, to purchase allowances if
they fly into, out of, or through the European Union.1 90 The
allowance requirement brought the ETS into the forefront of the
international community, as well as the question of whether the ETS
now complies with the WTO. While this question is outside of this
paper's scope, a quick word will be applicable for further discussion.
One of the key questions will be if there is de facto discrimination on
products imported from outside the European Union. 191 Although the
allowance will be imposed on all parties, it will be key to determine
whether or not European Union parties are benefited and therefore
non-compliant with Article III of GATT.
To avoid a trade spat with the United States and China, the
European Union has put the aviation scheme on hold for one year.192
However, their cap-and-trade EU-ETS program did not plan for the
severe recession and continuing malaise of the European economy.
This has resulted in carbon prices falling as economies fail to grow,
as shown in Figure 3. The commission postponed releasing 900
million tons of emission allowances to stop the market from
completely collapsing. 193 However, excess emission allowances by
2020 could total over two billion tons.
Figure 3: EU-ETS Carbon Price in Freefall1 94
JFMAMAJASONDJF~MAMJJ AS ONDJM AMJJAS ONDJFMAMJ JA SONDJfMAMJJIASONDJ
190. BARTELS, supra note 25, at 3.
191. Id. at 11-12.
192. EU Puts Airline Carbon Tax on Hold for a Year, EU BUSINESS (Mar. 21,
2013, 2:36 PM), available at http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/aviation-
climate.n8h.
193. Scott. supra note 188.
194. Id.
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Clearly, even the cap-and-trade programs already implemented
have issues complying with the WTO. Not only do cap-and-trade
programs fall short of reaching the optimal solution, as was promised
from programs like the Acid Rain cap-and-trade program, but
allowances may not conform to WTO regulations, as seen in the EU-
ETS Aviation Directive. Given the complexity and difficulty in
implementing a cap-and-trade program, other proposals, as illustrated
below, will achieve the reduction of carbon emissions more
effectively and have a stronger legal basis.
B. Border Tax Adjustments
The following proposals are BTAs as compared to the cap-and-
trade allowance, which is considered to be a market mechanism. A
BTA is defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development "as any fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole
or in part, the destination principle (i.e. which enable . . . imported
products sold to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax
charged in the importing country in respect of similar domestic
products)."l95 Additionally, according to Article 3.2, BTAs are
explicitly allowed as long as the tax on the imported goods does not
exceed a tax on a like domestic product.1 96
C. Carbon Tax
The second common proposal for a unilateral action is a carbon
tax. As illustrated below, a carbon tax is compliant with WTO rules,
but is not the most economical method to reduce GHG emissions.
Furthermore, given reluctance in accepting the carbon tax if a tax is
going to be imposed, the tax should be more encompassing so
additional political disputes do not need to occur later. However,
compared to the cap-and-trade program, the carbon tax is the better
of the two and a good second option because of the ease of
implementation, transparency, effectiveness, and legality.
195. Eichenberg, supra note 32, at 312 n.151.
196. Valentina Durin Medina & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, A Legal View on Border
Tax Adjustments and Climate Change: A Latin American Perspective,
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Fall 2010, at 29, 31 (2011).
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1. What Is a Carbon Tax?
A carbon tax has primarily been structured as a tax on energy, that
is, carbon based fuels that emit GHG. 197 Effectively, a carbon tax
only taxes emissions from burning fossil fuels. 198 The intention of the
tax is to internalize the externality so common emission producers
pay the true market cost. Currently, carbon taxes others have
proposed are only applied on fossil fuels, and not on all GHG
emissions. 199 This tax is imposed on any imported fossil fuels. Any
imports taxed need to be taxed at the same rate as the internal tax
rate. This tax is imposed upstream, or imposed at the time the fossil
fuel is extracted.200
The typical revenue structure of carbon tax proposals is to be
revenue neutral.201 First, the tax may be structured to decrease the
need to raise revenue in other ways, for example, by decreasing the
income tax rate.202 This would be one monetary incentive for
consumers to implement the tax. Another method that may be used to
create a revenue neutral tax is to have the tax be reimbursed to those
consumers hardest hit by the tax.203 Determining which method is the
most efficient is outside of the scope of this paper, however, if a
carbon tax is to be put into place, this issue would need to be
addressed.
2. Advantages of a Carbon Tax
Some of the advantages of a carbon tax include a set price for
carbon leading to price certainty, which results in simplicity and
easily understanding the tax and allows the tax to be put in place
204quickly, decreases the likelihood of fraud. Another significant
advantage of a carbon tax over a cap-and-trade program is that the
197. Young, supra note 149, at 1391.
198. Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?, SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL'Y, Winter 2008, at 67, 67 (2008).
199. Young, supra note 149, at 1392.
200. Introduction, CARBON TAX CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/introduction
(last updated Sept. 17. 2013).
201. See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 109, at 499.
202. Id. at 515.
203. Id.
204. Bryner, supra note 172, at 968.
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carbon tax would encourage a reduction in usage of carbon and direct
205the market towards more renewable (clean) energy. The carbon tax
would bring about price stability, as the industry would know (in
advance) what the tax rate would be, and therefore would consider
206the tax in making business decisions. This would create more
certain and stable markets, resulting in consistent action to reduce
emissions rather than price volatility, leading to uncertainty and
volatile market responses as seen in the current cap-and-trade
program of the European Union.207
Another advantage is that the tax would encourage companies to
continue to invest in new technologies. 208 With a carbon tax,
companies always have a monetary incentive to consider alternative
sources of energy compared to their current use of fossil fuels.
Additionally, the carbon tax also incentivizes consumers to request
and purchase lower emission products so the tax liability passed on to
them is reduced.209 Having the tax be transparently imposed and
passed on to the consumer will compel the reduction of fossil fuel
usage to the forefront of the political discussion. The transparency
also limits the possibility that companies will address the program
outside of the consumer's purview.
Finally, a carbon tax, once accepted, may be easily imposed.
Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would draft the tax
code, and after the initial legislation, the IRS would be able to adjust
the rate through legislation as the market responds. This would allow
the shock of the tax to be minimal before the tax rate increases to
encourage emission reductions. Furthermore, as a government
instituted and regulated action, the IRS would be able to monitor the
tax and ensure compliance in the same way it ensures income tax
compliance with the infrastructure that is already in place.
205. Zimmer, supra note 198, at 67.
206. Waggoner, supra note 170, at 1257.
207. Id. at 1260.
208. Young, supra note 149, at 1392.
209. Id.
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3. Disadvantages of a Carbon Tax
The greatest disadvantage, which is also an advantage, is the
transparency of the tax.210 Americans dislike paying taxes and, as
mentioned above, imposing a tax is one of the best ways to ruin a
politician's chances of being elected.211 The advantages that the tax
may bring might not be considered because Americans may stop
listening after the word "tax" is used. Another disadvantage of the
212
carbon tax is that the tax stops at emission-intensive fuels. The tax
is not imposed on goods or services. This is another serious limitation
of the tax, which the CTR will alleviate. Therefore, politicians may
need to ask for the American population to pay a tax twice if the
limited tax is not sufficient to mitigate climate change.
The carbon tax is also a unilateral mechanism that is used on a
multilateral issue213 and has increased the propensity for carbon
leakage. An industry is more likely to relocate to an "emission
haven" if one country is internalizing the externalities and another
country does not also adjust its industry to make the cost of the good
214
or service accurately reflect the fair market value. However, when
an industry is importing fuel, it will still be taxed at the internal tax
rate. But since the tax is imposed upstream, an emission-intensive
industry, such as the concrete industry, can move to the emission
haven and be more productive if there is a unilateral carbon tax
imposed in the United States. Therefore, the United States may lose
significant market share when imposing the tax in heavy emitting
industries.
4. Compliance with WTO
Traditionally, the proposals call for the carbon tax to be imposed
on energy, which is included in all goods and services. This leads to
210. Id. at 1394.
211. Jonathan Mann, Why Americans Hate Paying Taxes, CNN (Dec. 17, 2010,
12:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/12/17/jonathan.mann.us.taxes/
index.html.
212. Zimmer, supra note 198, at 67.
213. Jon M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental
Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries,
12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 151 (2010).
214. Id. at 152-54.
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WTO regulation analysis that is straightforward. As long as the tax
rate applies equally to each like product, for example a separate tax
on coal, oil, and gas, irrespective of where the fossil fuel originated
from, it will satisfy the most favored nation principle. Additionally,
the carbon tax must be imposed both internally and for foreign
products. Assuming that the tax is structured in such a way as to be
uniformly enforced, it will then satisfy the national treatment
principle. Given the ability for a carbon tax to clearly satisfy both the
most favored nation and national treatment principles, it does not
need to use the Article XX chapeau, but will also likely be
determined to be imposed uniformly and not a hidden restriction on
trade.
The carbon tax is a good first step in a unilateral climate change
mitigation effort. It does not, however, address the full problem.
First, the carbon tax only addresses upstream fossil fuels. Therefore,
GHGs emitted overseas from burning fossil fuels are not addressed,
and this could result in carbon leakage. Furthermore, the carbon tax
only applies to goods, not to services. Therefore, although the carbon
tax will legally satisfy the WTO regulations, it is not the most
efficient unilateral action to mitigate climate change.
D. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment
1. What Is a CTR?
A CTR is a carbon tax wherein the funds raised from the tax are
reinvested into clean energy sources, thereby forcing emissions
downward by removing high-carbon emitted power plants and
replacing them with low-carbon emitted power plants.215
A CTR is imposed on all goods and services within the United
States, as well as those that cross its domestic and international
borders. The rationale behind imposing the tax on both goods and
services is that a state's or country's citizens should be responsible
for the energy and pollution choices made by the state or country. By
allocating emissions using emission intensity, it then becomes
everyone's problem to solve the emissions dilemma by internalizing
the cost of all emissions in every good and service produced. This
also makes the calculations very simple, as emissions intensity is
215. Sewalk, supra note 106, at 609-10.
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essentially GDP divided by Total GHG emissions. This structure
allocates the burden to conserve and reduce emissions to all
producers and consumers.
Every activity, purchase, and consumption involves emissions.
216Emissions are released from our buildings (residential,
commercial, industrial), from our transportation between buildings,
from our industry, and through the movement of goods and services.
Therefore, all goods and services should be taxed to encourage
everyone to reduce emissions. The CTR is calculated in a manner
that allows it to be both compliant and effective at reducing
emissions both domestically and with imports. Additionally, the CTR
includes a reinvestment mechanism (addressed later), which will be
devoted exclusively to the promotion of clean energy resources.
2. How the CTR Is Structured
The CTR is structured as a carbon valued added tax (VAT). A
VAT is a tax "levied on sales of goods and services" and is usually
217imposed as a flat rate. A VAT tax can be implemented either
through the destination or the origin principle. 2 18 The origin principle
is when the product is taxed at the border where the good is produced
before being exported.219 A destination based VAT means that each
220
country taxes its own consumption, or it will tax the imports.
The CTR will be imposed based on the destination principle for
two predominate reasons: first it is more efficient, and second the tax
will be more effective. Using the destination principle will ensure
that the product is taxed downstream, and therefore the total
emissions inputs will be taxed. Since the single VAT will tax the
total emission inputs, it will affect the externalities that come into the
216. TAMIOTTI ET AL., supra note 3, at 27.
217. Christopher Deal, Note & Comment, The GATT and VAT: Whether VAT
Exporters Enjoy a Tax Advantage Under the GATT, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 649, 650 (1995).
218. See Katherine Baer et al., A Destination VATfor CIS Trade, MOCT-MOST,
Sept. 1996, at 87 (1996).
219. Id.
220. Jesus E. S. Oliveira, Economic Effects of Origin and Destination Principle
for Value-Added Taxes 17 (2001), http://www.gwu.edu/~ibi/minerva/spring200l/
jesus.oliveira.pdf.
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United States completely instead of only affecting a portion of the
externalities, making the tax more efficient.
Second, the destination principle will not require asking other
countries to impose a tax since the entire value of the product will be
taxed at the border, instead of only a portion of the product, to
achieve the same result. If the VAT was an origin-based tax, then the
United States would need all of the other countries to impose a CTR
so all GHG emissions are taxed, thereby internalizing all
externalities. Although it would be much more efficient if every
country adopted a CTR, it may take a while for universal
implementation to occur, and therefore, for now, the destination
principle is superior.
3. How the CTR Is Imposed
The CTR is applied at the point of production, or when a good or
service (goods)221 crosses a border. Therefore, the internal tax will be
calculated in the same method as a tax on imports, whether the good
crosses state borders or the U.S. border. The tax rate will be
calculated by looking at emissions intensity, and therefore will look
at all forms of emissions. The tax rate is calculated by first taking the
222total GDP of a country and dividing the GDP by the tons of GHG
emissions emitted in that country.223 This will be the emissions
intensity of the country, which will affect the next stage in the
calculation. Table 1 shows emissions intensity for several developed
countries.
221. To simplify our discussion of the CTR, the term "goods" will also include
any services that are imported.
222. For purposes of this section, "Country" also includes U.S. states.
223. Although the tax is called a carbon tax, it is all encompassing in that it will
take the total GHG emissions including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydroflourocarbons, per fluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride to internalize the
externality on all harmful GHG emissions.
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Table 1: Example of Emissions Intensity by Country224
Country GDP GHG Emissions
(Trillions of Emissions Intensity
Yr 2000 US $) (Metric tons ($ of GDP /
of C0 2) Ton of C0 2)
Germany $3,284.47 936,544,000 $3,507.01
United $2256.26 594,021,000 $3798.28
Kingdom
Japan $5495.38 1,257,982,000 $4368.41
United States $14,419.40 6,802,225,000 $2,119.81
With the emissions intensity, it is then possible to apply the
appropriate level of carbon tax to calculate the actual carbon tax.
Like the traditional VAT, the assumption is that exports (from a state
or country) will be tax free with the importing state or country
applying the tax. However, domestically-consumed goods are taxed
at the state or country level of tax. Continuing the table calculated
above, the following tax rates will be imposed. As seen in Table 2, a
good costing $500,000 is taxed based on the emissions intensity of
where it was produced.
224. World Bank Data: World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2014); Greenhouse Gas (GHGs)
Emissions Without Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), U.N.
DATA, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GHG&f-serieslD%/o3aGHG (last updated
Dec. 10, 2010).
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Table 2: CTR Applied to $500k of "Goods" by Country of
-rgn225Origmn
Country Emissions Cost of Tons of Carbon Tax
Intensity Good GHG Tax / Imposed
($ of GDP Imported Embedded Ton of
/ Ton of in CO 2
C0 2) "Goods"
Germany $3,507.01 $500,000 142.57 $5.00 $712.86
United $3798.28 $500,000 131.64 $5.00 $658.20
Kingdom
Japan $4368.41 $500,000 114.46 $5.00 $572.29
United $2,119.81 $500,000 235.87 $5.00 $1,179.35
States
The emissions intensity is calculated for every state and country
and applied either domestically or, if exported, when the good
crosses a border to reach its final destination. Therefore, if a good is
destined for Colorado, it will be taxed in Colorado. Colorado will
receive the revenue from the goods imported into its border
domestically, and the federal government will receive the tax when a
foreign good is imported into the United States. The tax rate is
calculated by using the exporting country's emissions intensity. This
will therefore encourage states and countries to use more clean
energy. For example, France's nuclear energy that has a low emission
output will have a low emissions tax rate. Any goods imported from
a foreign country will be taxed at the U.S. border, and the federal
government will receive that revenue to reinvest. Goods that are
received domestically will be taxed in the importing state, which will
receive that revenue.
Finally, the transportation of the goods will also be taxed. The fuel
used to ship products to the United States will be taxed from the
country that the imports came from. Additionally, transport trucks
used across the United States will also have their fuel taxed as part of
225. World Bank Data, supra note 224. The larger the emissions intensity, the
more energy efficient the economy.
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the cost of the imports. This is an area that has been largely unspoken
about when mitigating climate change, and one of the key areas that
may be used to reduce GHGs.
4. What Is the Tax Rate?
The tax rate will vary from year to year and will start out low in
226
order to allow the market to respond. Therefore, during the first
year of implementation, the tax rate will be five dollars per ton of
emissions. As the years progress, as funds are reinvested into clean
energy sources, and as industry and consumers have time to respond,
the tax rate will increase to fifty dollars per ton of CO 2 emissions.
The following table uses the same date as above and demonstrates
the effect of different tax rates.
Table 3: Increasing CTR Rate over Time (United States
Example)227
Carbon Embedded Tax Effective
Tax GHG (tons) Imposed Tax Rate
Applied
Year 1 $5 235.87 $1,179.35 0.24%
Year 2 $10 235.87 $2,358.71 0.47%
Year 3 $15 235.87 $3,538.06 0.71%
Year 4 $20 235.87 $4,717.41 0.94%
Year 5 $25 235.87 $5,896.76 1.18%
Year 6 $30 235.87 $7,076.12 1.42%
Year 7 $35 235.87 $8,255.47 1.65%
Year 8 $40 235.87 $9,434.82 1.89%
Year 9 $45 235.87 $10,614.18 2.12%
Year 10 $50 235.87 $11,793.53 2.36%
The rationale behind the increasing tax rate is twofold. First, the
initial low tax rate will help the economy absorb the shock of the
226. Sewalk, supra note 106, at 613.
227. Author has applied the increasing CTR to $500,000 of U.S. "goods." This
example assumes constant emissions levels. In fact, emission levels decline.
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rate. Second, the increase in the tax rate will coincide with a decrease
in revenue. The intention of the tax is to have emissions decrease at a
greater rate than the tax increases. This allows the total revenue to
eventually decrease as clean energy is constructed and deployed in
the countries adopting the CTR. It should be noted that this results in
significant direct (construction), indirect (materials, supplies), and
induced job creation. Through the gradual increase in the rate, both
of those objectives will be fulfilled.
5. Why the CTR Will Work
The CTR will work well for a variety of reasons. First, the tax is
simple to understand and apply. Emissions data and GDP are already
collected for countries and states, and therefore the tax will not
require additional research. Also, the tax does not require multiple
steps at this point since it would be the only tax of its kind-so as of
this point, double taxation is not a concern. If other countries were to
create a similar tax, negotiations would need to take place to ensure
that double taxation does not occur, but the European VAT can
provide clear guidance on that issue.228 This however, is only an
issue after other countries decide they want to implement a similar
tax.
An important reason why the United States should adopt this
structure is that the United States is a very important country when it
comes to imports, not just emissions, as a percentage of global trade.
The United States is responsible for over fourteen percent of total
global imports, $2.25 trillion, and is the number one import market in
the world as seen in Figure 4. Two key points: 1) this percentage
increases once the European Union is combined and/or trade between
the United States is taken into account, and 2) a significant share of
China's exports and imports are "value added," meaning parts are
produced in other countries, shipped to China to take advantage of
cheap labor (and cheap environmental costs), and re-exported.
Should the United States adopt this tax structure, the rest of the world
would have a tremendous incentive to adopt a similar structure to
minimize the tax on their goods so as to remain competitive in the
world's largest market. This strong effect will also be seen internally,
in that U.S. states with high emission outputs will also have an
228. See Baer et al., supra note 218, at 6.
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incentive to reduce their emissions in order to efficiently sell their
goods to the United States.
Figure 4: Imports and Exports by Country229
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6. Reinvestment
a. Domestic Reinvestment
One unique aspect of the CTR is the reinvestment. All revenue
collected from the tax will be used to reinvest in clean energy. For
domestic purposes, the tax collected within the state will be used
within its borders for clean energy. For example, if California
collects $1 billion from the CTR, California will use that revenue to
invest in building clean power plants that will reduce its total GHG
emissions over time. Guidelines will need to be established to
determine what will be considered to be proper reinvestment of the
revenue, but those guidelines will be intuitive.
229. Trade Growth to Slow in 2012 After Strong Declaration in 2011, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/presl2_e/
pr658_e.htm; World Bank Data, supra note 224.
[VOL. XXV
CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT
b. Foreign Reinvestment
Revenue collected on foreign imports by the federal government
will be reinvested in clean power plants to reduce emissions in the
highest emitting states first.230 The money may also be invested in
clean and safe power plant technology, but the best incentive to
develop clean power is in purchasing it in very large quantities.
Creating a significant market for clean power would allow the United
States to consider disseminating this clean energy technology to
foreign countries as a good faith effort to reduce overall GHG
emissions and as a way for the United States to reinvest in the world.
As the program continues and the tax rate increases, a portion of the
revenue could be reinvested in foreign countries to reduce emissions.
This reinvestment program will also have guidelines developed for
who may receive the money, and shall be given in such a way as to
both reward low emitting countries and also help high emitting
countries reduce their emissions.
7. Compliance with the WTO
a. Rationale for the Structure
A flat carbon tax that is imposed uniformly on total emissions
without calculating emissions intensity may be subject to the most
favored nation principle.231 Although the tax is a single rate for all
countries, each country emits different types of GHG. For example,
GHG emissions in 2010 came predominately from three sources, all
232fossil fuels. Additionally, different countries use different sources
to produce energy, which results in different emission intensities. For
example, seventy-five percent of France's energy comes from
230. Note that author is working on further research to propose that a portion of
monies collected on imported goods (and services) could also be used to fund the
Copenhagen Accord, where developed countries promised $100 billion a year to
developing countries to mitigate climate change.
231. See GATT, supra note 117, art. 1.
232. Forty-three percent of emissions were from coal, thirty-six percent were
from oil, and twenty percent were from gas. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2
EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: HIGHLIGHTS 19 (2012),
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf.
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233
nuclear energy whereas China produces sixty-nine percent of its
energy through coal.234
Different countries may therefore be able to argue that the energy
inputs from different sources are not like inputs, and through
imposing a uniform tax rate on every type of emissions, it is favoring
certain nations over others since the emissions come from different
make-ups.235 Treating all different types of energy resources equally
will result in discrimination and a violation of Article I of GATT.
This is because the tax is calculated by looking at the amount of GPD
per ton of emissions, resulting in an emissions intensity of GDP per
ton of CO 2 equivalent; essentially an input.
To avoid discriminating by source, this is solved by the United
States adopting a fifty U.S. State + Territory + D.C. individual CTR
rates. Meaning, each U.S. state will have its own carbon (value
added) tax structure. In this manner, U.S. states replicate the majority
of the world's countries in terms of emissions intensity as seen in
Table 4.
233. Nuclear Power in France, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf40.html (last updated Jan. 2014).
234. China, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/countries/
cab.cfm?fips=CH (last updated Feb. 4, 2014).
235. See Eric Phillips, Note, World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE
Case, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827, 842 (1996).
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Table 4: Emissions Intensity, Comparing U.S. States vs.
Select Countries 236
Emissions Intensities: U.S. States vs. Select Countries
$ of GDP per Ton of CO 2 Emissions
Alabama $892.86 India $448.43
California $3,703.70 Japan $3,448.28
France $4,000.00
Washington $2,941.18 United Kingdom $3,571.43
Colorado $1,886.79 Euro Area $2,500.00
United States $2,040.82
Texas $1,250.00 Australia $1,298.70
Wyoming $305.81 China $312.50
As Table 4 indicates, Wyoming and Alabama have similar
emissions intensity as India and China, while Texas has an emissions
intensity similar to Australia, and California's emissions intensity is
on par with Japan and France. The CTR would raise the needed
revenues to replace existing high emission power plants in the United
States, while also encouraging the adoption of the CTR around the
world in order for other countries to remain competitive in the United
States (and global) marketplace.
236. Table 4 represents emissions intensities using the 2005 comprehensive data
set. Current Dollar GDP and emissions data for U.S. states are provided by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the World Recourses Institute's Climate
Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT), respectively. BUREAU OF EcoN. ANALYSIS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov (last updated Mar. 7, 2014); Greg Fuhs,
A New, One-Stop Shop for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, WORLD RES. INST.
(July 10, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/new-one-stop-shop-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-data. GDP for countries is taken from World Bank data, World Bank
Data, supra note 224.
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b. Most Favored Nation
Since the CTR takes the emissions intensity as a whole for each
individual country, the emission inputs become like products.
Therefore, the tax rate based on total GHG emissions per GDP will
be imposed uniformly so each country will be subject to the same tax
rate. This is the rationale behind calculating each country and state
tax rate individually. Through calculating the emissions intensity of
one country, irrespective of how the energy comes to the country, it
is taking total emissions per country in every instance. Therefore, the
tax is measuring the total emission intensity input per gross domestic
product, making the tax rate apply to like products.
By applying the tax rate to U.S. states and territories, as well as
considering countries to be their own territory and calculating the
emissions intensity by using dollar of GDP per ton of GHG
emissions, this tax will not favor one country (or state or territory)
over another. Yes, clean energy countries (and states) will have a
lower total tax applied to their goods, but it is a result of the
calculation, not through discriminatory factors. Furthermore, the
countries that have the highest taxes will also receive some benefit
from the tax through the reinvestment clause, where taxes will be
devoted to aiding countries develop clean energy. Therefore, the tax
is fairly imposed on all countries and states, without any form of
discrimination.
c. National Treatment
237
Article 3.2 refers only to indirect taxes. An indirect tax is a tax
on a product and precludes direct taxes, such as a tax on income.238
The tax must be applied on goods or services. Further, GHG
emissions are considered to be an input of a product and therefore
may be taxable as part of the final product.23 9 This principle was
237. Pitschas, supra note 127, at 485.
238. Id.
239. Inputs for a product include raw materials, transportation, energy, and labor.
Any raw materials need to be mined, transported, and processed, which creates
emissions. Energy inputs also create emissions. Additionally, labor creates
emissions for two reasons: 1) labor consumes items that have emissions and 2)
labor needs transportation to the work site to create products (goods or services).
[VOL. XXV
CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT
solidified in Superfund, where the GATT Dispute Panel stated that a
240tax on input is an eligible BTA. Superfund addressed whether or
not a chemical that was used in the production of a good was an
allowable input that could be taxed, and the panel stated that a
241
chemical input could indeed be taxed. Presumably, the rationale
was that the input may be allowed since the chemical was essential to
creating the final product, just like GHG emissions are necessary to
the output of a final good or service. Therefore, a GHG emissions tax
is likely to be considered an allowable BTA. In addition, VATs are
compliant with the WTO. So structuring the CTR in a VAT format
further ensures its success.
The tax is imposed whenever a good passes into its intended final
destination. The tax is applied if a good is imported from California
into Ohio, or if it is imported from Australia into New York. The
only difference between a foreign import and a state import is which
entity will receive the revenue. The tax rate will be calculated,
imposed, and collected in the same manner. The uniformity of the tax
rate is part of the simplicity, which consequently makes the tax
transparent and compliant with the national treatment provisions of
Article III.242
d. Chapeau
Clearly, the tax may also be argued under the chapeau exceptions.
As the tax stands however, it complies with all of the WTO
regulations on its own. The chapeau therefore only bolsters the
argument that the tax complies with all regulation. Clearly, the tax is
seeking to protect an exhaustible natural resource by seeking to
243mitigate climate change, and it is also applied in a non-
discriminatory manner that is not a disguise to restrict trade. If the tax
were to be imposed on total emissions of a country, and not the
emissions intensity, it may have been arguably arbitrary and
See WORLD TRADE ORG., ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT 226 (1995), http://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt-ai-e/art6_e.pdf.
240. Pitschas, supra note 127, at 491.
241. See generally Report of the Panel, GATT, United States-Taxes on
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, BISD, L/6175 2.3 (1987).
242. GATT, supra note 117, art. 3.
243. Id. art. 20(g).
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discriminatory. The dispute panel would also more thoroughly
scrutinize the tax if it would raise revenue that could later mitigate
other taxes within the U.S. borders. Therefore, the tax should be
determined to comply with both Article I and Article III of GATT, as
well as the Article XX exception.
VII. CONCLUSION
Climate change is a significant problem that society must address
in the upcoming years. However, through looking at the history of
the issue, it is apparent that multilateral agreements often fall short in
creating quantifiable restrictions and making a practical difference.
Therefore, countries must look to unilateral actions to address the
issue. These unilateral actions must be able to function within the
international framework however, and therefore must be compliant
with WTO regulations. The CTR is a forward-looking option that not
only complies with WTO regulations, but also will affect how the
world looks at GHG emissions. The CTR changes common
perspectives regarding how to solve climate change by demonstrating
that not only is it affordable, but it can be done in an efficient and
effective manner.
Furthermore, a CTR can significantly reduce emissions by
proactively building new clean power plants and reducing the supply
of total GHG emissions. A CTR will also encourage other countries
to adopt it, much like the VAT (where rates vary from three to
twenty-two percent), which was initially adopted by Denmark in
1967,244 quickly followed by other countries in the European Union,
245
and later adopted by over 150 countries. The other countries will
do so to reduce their total GHG footprint in order to remain
competitive in international markets.
244. Gilbert A. Metcalf, Value-Added Taxation: A Tax Whose Time Has Come?,
9 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 121 (1995).
245. Global Indirect Tax Rates, DELOITTE, http://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/
pages/tax/solutions/global-indirect-tax-rates.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
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